Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

State of Utah v. Randolph Craig : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Andrew A. Valdez; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Craig, No. 16422 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1737

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
~

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case Ho.

-vs-

16422

RANDOLPH CRAIG,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL PROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVA'RD
ROBBERY RENDERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKB
COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 1 THE RONORABLB JU
E. BANKS, JUDGE, PRESmDTG

ROBERT B, HANSEN

Attorney General
EARL F, DORIUS

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

8411~

Attorneys for Respondent
ANDREW A. VALDEZ

Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

F ~ ltD
2 1980

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-..-·······---

C'- -·~ .:. -

..

;

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STl\.TE!!El:T OF THE NhTURE OF THE CASE-----------------DISPOSITION IN THE 10\'IER COURT----------------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-----------------------------STATE!:ENT OF THE FACTS-------------------------------

1
1
2
2

POHn I:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
l·10TIO:J FOR DISI1ISSAL AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CASE SINCE
THERE \vAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND
JUDG!,!ENT OF GUILT----------------10
POI:;T II: or; hP?EAL, EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
VIEHED IN THE LIGHT MOST
F.~.VOR.;BLE TO THE VERDICT OF
CONVICTION-----------------------18

cc::::::xs I o:; -------------------------------------------2 o
:::.:;SES CITED

::;.c:1cl v. i:c.ll,
Sta~e

•·

Stc. te
te
Stat:e

\'

s

~a

S-::a~e

",.]

.
.

\'

State v
State
S"':.at.e

\'

s~a~e

St. ate

State
5tace

\'

S-:::.te

\'

122 L:tah 589, 253 P.2d 355 (1953)----19
Berchtold, ll Ctc.h 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183
:1960)-------------------------------------18
C'a:--.i<:s, 19 Utah 20. 162, 350 P. 2d 146 (1960) --18
Eric!:scr., 565 P.2ci 750 (Utah 1977)----------19
~stradc.,
119 Uta."l 339, 227 P.2d 247 (1951)--13
Ga!lcee, 5G7 P.2ci 1064 (Utah 1978)-----------19
GarCla, ll l'tah 2ci 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960)---ll
Jo:--.c-t, 55E P.2C. ~'..0 (Utah 1978)--------------17
:-:idae'..stc.ct, 579 P.2ci 908 (Utah 1978)-------13,15
~ills,
530 P.2c i272 (Ucah 1975)------------13,15
:ioore, l l l Ctar. 453, 183 P.2d 973 (1947)----13
Pencierviile, 2 Ctah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195
(19:~ -------------------------------------10,11
::\ecce.:-., 550 P.2c 728 (Utah 1976)-----------19
P.:ve!l ~rch, :1 Ctah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689

1196

-~-----------------------------------11

-iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976)-----------11,13,14
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976)-------15,16
,_
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212
(1957)------------------------------------13,18
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P. 2d 865 (1959) ----18
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977)------------13
State v. Woodall, 6 Utah 2d 8, 305 P.2d 473
(1956)------------------------------------11
STATUTES
utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

( 1953), as a.r:1ended-- ------ 1
( 1953) , as alilended-------- 1
( 19 53) , as arnended--------12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

S'C;::·E OF UTk.H,

Plalntiff-Respondent,
-"-.?S-

Case No. 16422
CRJ..IG,

?~::.:;;:JOLPH

De:endant-Appellant.

RESPO~<DE:1T

BRIEF OF

:~ATU?E

S'='.::.'Cn:E'IT Or THE
~~pella~t
\·~::..a'::~o:-.

~as

charged

c: l"tah co::e ;..:u•..

A::ella~t

c:

c~e

:9-8,

aggravated robbery,

in

(1953), as amended.

THE LOh'ER COl'RT

tried be:ore a jury and found guilty

count of aggravated robbery on September 20 and 21,
~n

the

7~ird

Jud1cial Court, 1n and for Salt Lake

S::a:e c= C::ar.,

C::;..;.:--.::·:,

C:::::o;_::~:-

t~E

~as

~ith

/E-6-302

§

;:JISPOSI':'IO:' E

OF THE CASE

:r,

~c;.-c.,

'":he Honorable Jay E.

a~~,ellc..nt

Banks, presiding.

conroitted to the custody

J:v_s!cn a: Correc'::10ns :or a ninety day evaluation

=~!-s.Jc.:-.:

':.C

t·:c.:-.. co::e .'-.nr..

§

16-3-~0~

(1953), as amended.
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On

of the Division of Corrections for another such ninety day
evaluation.

On April 3, 1979, appellant was sentenced to

the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not
less than five years to life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON

APPEF~

Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and
judgment of the lmver court.
STF.TEME!lT OF THE FACTS
At about 2:50 a.m. on July 6, 1978,
assistant manager of the 7-11 store at

~inth

~obert

Skelto~.
F1~th

South and

East in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah was robbed at
gunpoint of approx1mately one hundred and fifty dollars by
two

~lack

men

(Tr.

82, 83).

The men told Mr.
Mr. Skelton

them the money from the t1ll.

Skelton to g:ve

~ut

curr~~cy

One of the assa:lants rtacted

the till into a paper sack.

lnto the till and put what co1ns he could reach
till into the paper bag.

Mr.

the counter when he was struck by the
of the JT1en, later 1dentif1ed by '·1r.

~ive
o~

('Tr.

ffiinutes,

the robbery

~ro~

the

Skelton gave the bag to

of the assailants and was in the process of

Lee Poole

cli~bi~g

shotgu~

o~e
ov~r

wielded by

and the store was well

l_ctt~d

~·

:nc

·J~c

27).
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o~e

Skelto:1 at tr:al as t:e:--.co~

83, 86, 121).

(Tr.

~rc~

vehicle sped up and almost immediately made a right turn
to go westbound on Downington Avenue

(Tr. 24).

Sergeant

Brown followed the suspect automobile and saw it stopped
at the north curb of the street.

He observed two individual,

running from the car northward up a driveway of a house
on the street (Tr. 26).
Sergeant Brown approached the car and saw a th1rd
fro~

individual who had gotten out and who was walking away
the car.

Sergeant Brown ordered the ind1vidual to stop,

detained him, and later had him arrested (Tr.

26-29).

S e rc;ec:.:

Brown identified defendant Poole at trial as the 1nd1v1dual
arrested at that time (Tr.

27).

Sergeant Brown observed a shotgun 1n plain s1ght
on the rear floor of the vehicle v;h1ch matched the descr1pt1c:
of the weapon used in the robbery that had been given by the
police dispatcher (Tr. 28, 29).

By that t1me,

Officer~

?les;

and hdams had arrived at the scene, pursuant to commur.1cat:::.
from Sergeant Brown.
i~,

Officer Pless entered the car,

and seized evidence

(7r.

29).

Sergeant Brown 2.nd

searchE~
Of:'~ce:

Pless made a search of the area :or suspects while Of:'icer
Adams placed defendant Poole

u~der

arrest.

The

officers were unable to loc2.te the suspects (Tr.

sfarcr.i~c:

30).

addition, other pol1ce off1cc:rs callc"d Jnto the arc·a

Ir,
v:<~l-,_
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unable to locate the suspects as there were only two or
three officers searching on foot at any one time (Tr. 41)
Officer Michael Pless testified that he seized
several evidentiary items from the suspect vehicle, including
a

sho~gun,

and food

some currency and coins in a sock, cigarettes,

ite~s.

Pless testified that he recovered one

~hirty-four

hundred

dollars in currency and twenty-five

dollars and t\-.'0 cents in coins (Tr. 49) .
Seroeant Allen Clark was in the vicinity of Fifth
East and Sixth South in the early Darning hours of July 6,
1973, en9aged 1n his patrol activities and spec:fically
~or

look1n9
~-ll

~~o

s~ore.

pcl1ce

1nd1viduals suspected of the robbery of the
suspects had been described by the initial

~he

1nves~1gatcr

on the scene and by later police radio

52) .
5lspa~cher

~~sp~c~s

~-

?curth

--~

~he

~a:e

broadcas~

~he

~ere

Eas~

~:~e

-··

So~e

tlDe after the robbery, the police

add1t1onal

s~ill

~he

:n~ormation

that the two

loose had been seen proceeding north

v1c1n1tv of E1ghth to Seventh South.

c: the broadcast, Sergeant Clark saw two black

:~d:v1dua!s

cross

~he

in~ersect1on

of Sixth South and

Clark broadcast this information

:.~

Ea~:

.·.:-.' ~·-

a~~

S:xt~

:.·-- co·,...:l~

Sc~th

soc:hbound, went west on Sixth

see ;1c:-t:-

o~

Fourth East, and sav.'
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nobody (Tr. 52-54).
Officer Charles Cockayne was in the vicinity of
Sixth South and Fourth East at approximately 5:00a.m. on
July 6, 1978, looking for suspects of the robbery of the
7-11 store.

Cockayne testified that while at that location

he saw in a field an object which he perceived to have the
form of a man.

It was still dark at that time, and the

field was covered with dry weeds standing three to four
feet high.

Officer Cockayne stared at the object for a

moment, saw that it moved, and alerted other police officers
by radio that he had "possible suspects in the field."
57-58).

(Tr.

Cockayne got out of his car, ran toward the field

looking at the suspect and pointed out the location of the
suspect to Officers Rackley and Adair, who had arrived at
the scene.

These other officers approached the field from

another direction. and one of them stated that
individual was fleeing through the field

(~r.

anot~er

59).

~he

suspect seen by Cockayne was subsequently arrested, and the
officers in the vicinity cordoned off the area and began a
yard to yard search of the area (Tr.
for approximately one half-hour to

60).

i'.ftcr searching

forty-~1ve

ninutes,

Officer Cockayne climbed over a s1x-foot h1gh fence beh1nd
a house to check some bushes located in front of a tus:ness
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building (Tr.

61,

62).

position in the bush.

Cockayne found appellant in a sitting
Appellant's cap was about the same

level as the bushes and he was wearing a black leather
jacket, shoes, shirt, levis, and a denim cap.
It was the testimony of Officer Russell Adair
that he saw appellant run from the field which Adair had
entered,

jump a fence and disappear into a yard (Tr. 73, 74).

of=lcer Adair testified further that appellant had on a
dark jacket and some type of hat (Tr. 74).
vic~im

Robert Skelton, the
that he had
rcCbery.
!~to

sa~

:~e

appellant three times on the night of the

First, appellant and another black man had come

the store to purchase several ltems.

Second, Skelton

apcellant near the phone booth in front of the store.

:~~rd,
,~:-.

see~

of the robbery, testified

Skelton saw appellant

9S,

99).

duri~g

the course of the robbery

Skelcon =ailed to identify appellant during

course of a lineup pr1or to appellant's preliminary

hs ~ar as I can re~~nber, I was
tcld a: :he :1~e o= the lineup to put
do~n a cerso~'s number 1n a block and
~ha: :~~: person played their role in
cche ro:::ber·: ;s1c] 1f I ·.-:as ?OSitive
~ha~ \{25 ~~e person.
I~ n~· o~n mind
I a~ not co1~c to coint a f1nger at
so~~b~5~· ~~d ~a~· t~at 1s ~he person if
I :r: r:-:: o·..:n :--1:-:d at tha
time v.·as not
?Os:..t~:-e -:~2.
-:~a:. 1s t e person, and
~~a~ :~ ;;~~said I d:
~ot recognize
a:-.~:!=.oC:~-

-:+-

:

~

:.:nc.

r.

127).
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At trial Mr. Skelton testified that there was no
chance that he could be mistaken about the identification
of appellant as a participant in the robbery of the 7-11
store (Tr. 121,122).

Mr. Skelton further testified that he

was positive about the identification of appellant as one
of the perpetrators of the robbery (Tr. 127).
Appellant testified in his own behalf at tr1al
that he was in Salt Lake on the ni?ht of the robbery, and
had been in Salt Lake fer two days previous.

Appellant

had less than twenty dollars with him when he arr1ved in
Salt Lake (Tr. 141).

He did not try to stay at the Salvat1on

Army or other organ1zation that puts transients up, and he
testified that he did not know such places were open all
night even though he test1fied that he had hitchhiked

thrcus~

most of the States of the Union (Tr. 141, 144, 145).
According to appellant's testimony, he had gotten a r:de
from a

lon~-haired

individual in

~

,e early morning hours

o~

July 6, 1978 to L1berty Park where appellant spent the
night (Tr. 135, 136).

T~ough

appellant had been dr1nk1ng

a lot of beer and had not had any sleep for two days, he
testified that he could not sleep in the park

(Tr. 144).

Appellant further testif1ed that he left the park and star:c:
to walk in the d1rect1on he thought would lcQd hirr to the
Continental Trailways Bus Station where he had

l··~t

sc~
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lu(Jgage.
t~clr

Appellant testified that he saw police cars with

spotlights and flashing lights on, leaned up against

a house until the cars passed by, climbed over a fence in a
backyard and hid in the bushes until he was found by
office:::- Cockayne
A~

(Tr. 144-146).

trial, appellant's motions to dismiss the case

against h1m, or in the alternative, for a directed verdict
Jpon

~he

Sta~e

~ppellant's
~e:::-e

rene~ed

::,·· Judg·

resting were denied by Judge Banks (Tr. 129-131)

rnot1ons to dismiss and for a directed verdict
upon the defense resting and were again denied.

San':s

(Tr. 162, 169).
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
CASE SINCE THERE \~AS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT OF GUILT.
In proceedings before Judge Banks and out of the
presence of the jury, appellant moved for dismissal of the
case against him, or in the alternative, for a directed
verdict, at the conclusion of the respondent's case-in-chief
on the grounds that there was a reasonable doubt as to
Robert Skelton's identification of appellant and that there
was conflict between the testimony of Officer Cockayne and
Officer Adair as to whether appellant was in the field
where defendant thlliams was found (Tr. 131).
denied both motions.

Judge Banks

Appellant again moved for d1smissal

or in the alternative for a directed verdict upon

defe~se

resting, and the motions were again denied by Judge Banks
on the grounds that since there was direct testimony that
appellant was the man that robbed Skelton, the question of
appellant's guilt was a question for the trier of fact, the
jury, to determine (Tr. 168, 169).
This Court, 1n State v. Penderville, 2 Ctah 2d
281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954)

upheld a convictlon c:

s~c::cnd

deere,'

murder in spite cf a challenge to the tr1al court's fa1lure
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to direct acquittal.

The Court there wrote:

It has been repeatedly held by
this court that upon a motion to dismiss
or to direct a verdict of not guilty for
lack of evidence that the trial court
does not consider the weight of the evidence or credibility of the witnesses,
but determines the naked legal proposition
of law, whether there is any substantial
evidence of the guilt of the accused, and
all reasonable inferences are to be taken
1n favor of the State .
. [I] f there is
before the Court evidence upon which
reasonable men might differ as to whether
the defendant is or is not guilty, he may
deny the motion (emphasis added).
272 P.2d 195, 198.
See also State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355
P.2d 689
473
:07

(1960); State v.

(1956)

\~oodall,

6 Utah 2d 8, 305 P.2d

and State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d

(1960)
In the instant case, there was direct testimony

of the

victi~

o~

·.·.·as one

o~

s::ore.

;..j:lpellant

~he

robbery, Rotert Skelton, that appellant

the persons v:ho corrun1tted the robbery at the 7-11
tes1:1fied that he did not rob Mr. Skelton.

5:..::::'1 conflicti!1C -cest1:nony satis~1es the Penderville,
?r::~~s:on

supra,

t'lat the court may deny the motion to dismiss if

the Co:..:rt has before 11: ev1dence apon which reasonable men
as tc whe1:her the defendant is or is not guilty.
I:-, t~'1<= case of Sta-ce ,.
~s~c),

Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah

thls Cot.:rt esta'=:l1shed the burden ,__·hich the prosecution

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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must bear to establish a prima facie case:
In order to submit a question to
the jury it is necessary that the _rosecution establish a prima facie case.
That is, it is necessary to present some
evidence of every element needed to make
out a cause of action, and it has long
been established that such may be proven
by direct and by circumstantial evidence.
But the evidence required need only be
that which is sufficient to conform to
the statutory definition of the crlme
charged, and the "element of each offense"
is defined as (a) conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct; and
(b) the requisite mental state.
At the trial of this case, the State introduced
direct testimony that established that an Aggravated

Rother~

was committed by an armed indi Vldual at the time a!ld place
question

:~.

The State introduced further direct testimony tha:

a second individual assisted in the robbery.

This seco!ld

individual lS clearly guilty of Aggravated Robbery under
provisions of Ltah Code Ann.

§

~~e

76-2-202 which orovides that:

Every person
. who directly
commits the offense
. or lntentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an o~fense
shall be criminally liable as a party
for such conduct
The State produced dlrect evidence that

estatlls~·~

appellant's identity as the second individual invclved 1n
robbery.

:~~

Robert SJ.:elton, the v1ctur. of :he roLter:: :·_ .s::L':·c~

as follows at trlal:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11r. Skelton, is there any chance
that you're mistaken about the identification of 11r. Craig?

Q.

A.

No, sir.

Q.
Are you certain that Mr. Craig was
the individual that you observed with 11r.
Poole at the time you were robbed?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Is there any question in your mind
that your identification is wrong?

(Tr.

A.

:Jo, sir.

Q.

You have no doubt whatsoever?

121, 122)
It is a \·Jell-settled axiom of criminal law in this

Sta~e

~ha~

·,.:l~''"sses.

\l'J5-);

the jury is the sole JUdge of the credibility of
(Stac:e v.

Sc:llivan,

6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212

StatE \'. Estrada, 119 Utah 339, 227 P.2d 247

(1951)

Sc:c.-::•c ·:. ::ocre,

lll Ctah 458, 183 P.2d 973

(1947); State v.

:.:::C~s,

~272

Romero, supra;

530 P.2d

(;,_·tah 1975); State v.

a :1 c S ~ =. ':: e v . ; ; : 1 so r. , 56 5 P . 2 d 6 6 ( Utah 19 77 ) ) •
ThE ffiCrE
o~

~ra~0d

~estl~onv
7~e

~arrow

thE
a-::

questio:-1 here involves the credibility

cri~e,

Rober~

Skelton, who gave uncorrob-

tr1al of the events of the robbery (Tr.

recent case

o~

State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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908

(Utah 1978), sets out the basis on which a reviewing

court must deal with uncorroborated evidence.
In general, the common law supports the
contention that a conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony
of the victim, and that such evidence is
not insubstantial simply because the
testimony is conflicting in some respects.
As to the quality of the testimony given,
it is settled that it must be so improbable
that it is completely unbelievable before
it is insufficient to uphold a conviction.
We do not find that to be the case here
(emphasis added;.
579 P.2d at 911.
Appellant does not claim that Skelton's testimony
is so improbable that it is completely unbelievable.
submits that Skelton's testimony is not "completely unbelievc:
as witnessed by the jury's one hour deliberation and verdict
of guilty after a two-day trial.
In State v. Romero, supra, the Utah Court ruled,
regard to a revleWlng Court's weighing the evidencG, that:
This Court has long upheld the standard
that on an appeal from conv1ction the
Court cannot weigh the evidence.
Further, this Court has malntained that
its function is not to determine guilt
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the credibllity of
witnesses, or the weight to be given
defendant's testlmony .
'We are
concerned only with the question of the
sufficiency of the evldence to sustal~
the convictions by showing that th~ Jury
would have found beyond a reasonablt
doubt that defendants were auilty.
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
554by P.2d
at Law
218.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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v:~-

This jury role was echoed in State v. Mills, supra,
where this Court said:
It is the prerogative of the jury to
judge the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, and the facts
to be found therefrom.
530 P.2d at 1272.
As to the specific evidentiary matter of uncorroborated
testimony, State v.

~liddelstadt,

supra, holds:

. there is no rule governing how
many ~itnesses are needed or that the
test1mony need be corroborated by other
evidence be~ore the trier of fact can
decide how to determine the weight of
the testimony.
579 P. 2d at 911.
The jGrors were not abligated to accept appellant's
expla~ation
=rl~e.

r r~-:a'--.

as

of his involvement or non-involvement in the

~as

dec1ded in State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193

1916):

In regard to defendant's contention
that the evidence lS not sufficient to
justify his conviction, these observations
are pertlnent:
The jury ~ere not obligated
to ac=ept as true defendant's ~on version
of the evidence nor his self-exculpating
state~en-:s as to his intentions and his
conduc-:.
They were ent1tled to use their
o-..;;-, j udCTient as to \,·hat ev1dence they would
be:1e~e

and

therefrom
- ..

~

~.2C.

at

~o

~ra~

an~·

reasonable inferences

(emphasls added).

1?5.
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The Schoenfeld rule is most applicable in the
present matter.

After the State had presented its evidence,

and appellant had testified as to his non-involvement in the
robbery, the jury was given the matter resolution.

At that

point, the jurors may properly "use their own judgment" in
arriving at the verdict.

Their deliberations must be given

great deference in order for them to determine "what evidence
they would believe and to draw any reasonable inferences
therefrom."

Id.

The standard a reviewing Court must apply 1n determining whether to reverse a conviction or an '' insuffic1ency
of the evidence" claim is set out succinctly in State v.
Romero,

supra:
This court has set the standard for
detemining suff1ciency c:' evidence
to require that it be so :~conclus1ve
or so inherently improbable tha~
reasonable minds could not reasonably
believe de:endant had comm1tted a crime.
Unless there is a clear show1ng of lack
of evidence, the jury verdict will be
upheld.

554 P.2d at 219.
Respondent subm1ts that 1n view1ng the ev:dence -··
its entirety, as the jury did,

lt 1s not "so inconclusl\·c- ·Jr

so inherently improbable that r<easonable minds" could not
co~vict

appellant.

On the contrary,

respo~Oc-;'.t

cOT"J:_c"nds l:~.~:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

the evidence was sufficient and substantial and that,
therefore,

the jury verdict should be upheld.
Finally, respondent would offer the relevant

language of State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978) as a
dispos1t1ve statement in resolving this appeal:
The cautionary rule just referred
to [the reasonable hypothesis rule] is
but a specific application of the most
basic principle in our criminal law:
that an accused is presumed to be
l~~ocent until his guilt is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consequently,
1f there is any reasonable view of the
credible evidence which is reconcilable
Wlth ~he defendant's in~ocence, it would
na~urally follow that there would be a
reasonable dcubt as to his guilt.
But
we emphas1ze that this does not mean
JUS~ any view of any of the evidence,
however unsubstant1al or incredible,
wh1ch a cartv to such a controversy may
C.rea.~, up.
*
*
*

~h1s 1s ~ecessarily true because
:.n cerformino ~heir dutv as finders of the
fac~ :h=v ar~ the exclu~ive judges of the
cred:t:li~v of ~he evidence.
In so doing,
the·: .. a·· c~ns1der all o.:: ~he facts affirmat'~ely- ~hown, as well as any unexplained

c·::de:-.c-=:.

a=~~s,

a~d

~=a~

~ha:ever

1n~erences

may

fa:rlv and reascnablv be drawn therefrom
:.n th~ !:cht o= thei~ cwn exper1ence and
_.·c:c"·'e:-.~.
::::-, co:>sider:.:>g ,,·hat happened
:.n th:s case 1:1 accordance with the reasoning
d:.sc~ssec above, the JUrors could fairly and
r~~8c~at:~· cc~clude t~a~ i~ \~as the defendant
·,.::-.c

~2-:~·..~

1-:~~C

:_~'1e

cr:.. ... ~. J
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Respondent suggests that the same reasoning is
applicable to the present case and resolves the appeal in
favor of the respondent.
POINT II
ON APPEAL, EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED
IN THE LIGHT HOST FAVORABLE TO THE
VERDICT OF CO!'<VICTION.
At trial, the flnder of fact,

in this case the

jury, found appellant guilty of Aggravated Robbery.

On

appeal, the evidence should be viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict of conviction.
10 Utah 2d 34,

341 P.2d 865

(1959);

11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960).

State v. 1\ard,

State v. Berchtold,
The finder of fact,

here the jury, was in the best pos1t1on to observe the
facial expressions, mannerisms and tone of voice of wltnesse!
and thus was in the best position to weigh the ev1dence.
Those kinds of judgme:1ts are diff1cult, 1f not impossible,
to make on appeal.

By examining the evidence, however, 1:

is obvious that the jury's verdict is heavily supported t·
the evidence.

The verdict w1ll not be overturned en appeal

unless it appears that the ev1dence was so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have

Lntertai~

reasonable doubts that the cr1me v:as cor.c-,1 tte:O.
Sullivan,
146

supra; State: v.

DanY:s,

l~

L'tat 2d 1(:,

3:::,0 F.=:d

(1960).
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Further, the Utah Court has determined that on
appeal from conviction, the Supreme Court must assume that
the jury believed those aspects of evidence and drew inferences
co~ld

that reasonably

be drawn therefrom in the light favorable

to the verdict.

State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977)

S-:ate v.

587 P.2d 1064

Gandee,

~hat

defendant's version of

(Utah 1978).

And where the

occurred is sharply different in

vltal aspects from the State's evidence, the Supreme Court
is obllged to assurr.e on appeal from a conviction that the
JUr~

believed that

Peoci:hs:--,,
s-::c:c:1g

550 P.2d 728

presu.-,p-:~o:-.

-:or prevall, has
u~~~~s2~alte,
~~e

a~~

~hich

a~=~~~s

~c

a~d

supports their verdict, State v.

(Utah 1976).

In other words, the

lS the trial •:erdict is correct.

t~e

t~rden

~~~s

~e

Appellant,

to prove that the verdict was

has fa1led to do.

:es::~o:-;

o~

~o~~:~~

~o~e

appellant is highly improbable
t~a~

seli-serving protestations

Th:s Court has pointed out that:
A ~~:-der of fact is not necessarily
bounci :c acce~t as concluslve a testimony
o~ a 1-:~-:r.ess.· E:s crec:bility may be
~~=~ache~ tc· sE:f-interest or improbability
so. :hat :: ~oulc be entlrely wlthin the
r·~a:r c~ ~e2so~ ~o 6:sc2u~t or to entirely
G2-sc:-·:::C.::. 1:..
589,

253 P.2d 355,

356

( 19 53) .

rv.dcnce a:1d the reasonable inferences
l:ch:

~est

favorable to the jury's
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verdict, it cannot be said that a reasonable jury would
necessarily entertain some substantial doubt of appellant's
guilt.

The jury's verdict was amply supported by the

evidence and on appeal, the evidence should be viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict of conviction.
CONCLUSIO>.J
Claims on appeal of insufficiency of the evidence
must be reviewed in light of the total evidentiary picture.
The uncorroborated testimony of Robert Skelton is not per
se a dificient form of evidence and can only be determined
insufficient where the Court finds the testimony to be
completely unbelievable.

The jury's verdict which relied on

Skelton's testimony is therefore a proper one since a careful
review of the trial transcript shows that the testimony was
sufficiently believable.
On the basis of the above authority and the

eviden~

against appellant shov:n at trial, respondent prays that the
verdict and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully
ROBERT B.

submit~ed,

HJ..l:SEN

Attorney General
Er..RL F. DORILlS
.L.ssistant j".,t torney G(":1eral
Attcrne~·s

fo~

Rcspo~dc~t
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